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Abstract
We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider's incentives to invest
in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to
be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide
counterexamples. The introduction of downstream competition for the market can sometimes
improve incentives. With suitable non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation
become identical to those under integration.
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1 Introduction
The privatization and deregulation of network industries in industrialized
countries has generated a number of success stories. Nevertheless, there are
also concerns about inadequate institutions. In particular, vertical separa-
tion of network industries is often seen as the main culprit for insuﬃcient
investment into network quality. In this paper, we shall analyze the eﬀects of
alternative institutional arrangements on the incentives to invest in network
quality.1
There are various dimensions in which the institutions shaping deregu-
lated network industries diﬀer widely across countries and industries.
(i) Degree of vertical integration. The most radical form of restructuring
is full vertical separation, as it was adopted, for example, in the U.S.
telecommunications industry in 1984 (breakup of AT&T), and in the
British railway industry in 1994 (breakup of British Rail).2 At the
other extreme is the full vertical integration approach, adopted e.g. in
the Swiss railway industry.3 Elsewhere, intermediate approaches were
taken.
(ii) Form of network access. There may be exclusive access to segments of
the network for local monopolists, as in the British railway industry,
where the local monopolies were auctioned oﬀ by a franchising agency.
In other countries, such as Germany or Switzerland, local monopolies
for designated network segments are supplemented by services that
are subject to open and non-discriminatory access. Thus, in principle
several companies can use the same part of the network at diﬀerent
times, just as diﬀerent telecommunications companies can use the same
local loop to individual households to provide their services.
1Throughout the paper, we will compare diﬀerent types of privatized industries, rather
than privatized and state industries.
2See Shaw (2000) and the references therein for further details on the British rail-
way reform. Our descriptions of the British railway system refer to the time before the
restructuring since autumn 2001.
3See Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications
(1996).
1
(iii) Access tariﬀs. In some cases, access tariﬀs are set freely by the net-
work provider, subject only to competition policy, in other cases there
is access price regulation. Another important issue is whether access
prices are strictly linear in the amount of network access demanded, or
whether fixed components are used. In the British railway system tar-
iﬀs were non-linear.4 In Germany, providers of transportation services
used to be allowed to opt for two-part access tariﬀs with a relatively
low variable component rather than a linear tariﬀ.5 In the Swiss railway
industry, in turn, access tariﬀs are linear and regulated. The same is
true for the telecommunications industry in many countries.
To investigate the eﬀects of such institutional diﬀerences, we model an
industry in which an essential input–network infrastructure–can be pro-
vided at various quality levels. High network quality is costly to provide,
but increases the value of the industry’s final output to the consumer. Un-
der vertical integration, a single firm decides on investment levels and output
prices. Under vertical separation, the upstream firm decides on the quality of
the network and sells the right to use the network to a downstream firm that
provides the final product. The downstream firm, in turn, pays an access
price which is determined according to the rules specified by the regulatory
regime, but is independent of network quality.
Our main results are as follows. First, with linear access prices incentives
to invest are generally smaller under vertical separation than under integra-
tion. This is partly due to the familiar vertical externality argument that
a separated upstream monopolist ignores the positive eﬀect on downstream
profits. The result is non-trivial, however, because the move from separation
to integration also aﬀects retail prices, which generates subtle demand eﬀects
that may work against the standard argument. Second, introducing down-
stream competition has ambiguous eﬀects on quality. Third, with non-linear
access prices investment incentives are the same as in the integrated case, if
4Over 90% of access revenues were generated by the fixed component; see British Oﬃce
of the Rail Regulator (1999, 1.17).
5The system had been introduced mainly because of expected positive eﬀects on the
number of trains provided by the transport operating companies (Knieps, 1998).
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the network owner can set the fixed components so as to fully extract the
downstream profit.
Unsurprisingly, the diﬀerence between integration and separation would
vanish if access prices were allowed to depend on quality. However, access
prices usually reflect network quality increases only to a very limited extent,
presumably reflecting problems of verifiability.6
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce our analytical
framework (section 2). Then we compare the investment incentives under
vertical integration and vertical separation with linear access prices in the
absence of competition (section 3). In section 4, we consider competition
for the market and non-linear access prices as potential means of improving
investment incentives. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Set-Up
This section develops a simple model of quality-enhancing investment in a
network industry.
2.1 Assumptions
We consider an industry with a vertical structure. Suppose that in order
to deliver the final product (e.g. electricity, telecommunications services,
transportation), the producer of the final product needs access to an inter-
mediate good (the network). One unit of the intermediate good is required
to produce one unit of the industry’s final product. Demand for the final
good takes the form D(p, θ), where p > 0 is the price of the final output,
and θ ≥ 0 denotes the quality of infrastructure. D(p, θ) is non-increasing in
p and non-decreasing in θ. Here, θ should not be interpreted as an easily
measurable variable, but as an aggregate of all aspects of infrastructure that
have positive eﬀects on demand.7 Though some aspects of quality are usually
6For instance, in the German railway system, there are six classes of network quali-
ties, which exclusively reflect the speed which is possible on the network. Other quality
distinctions are absent (Berndt and Kunz, 1999).
7In the railway example, the quality of the tracks and signalling aﬀect punctuality,
speed, and safety; the accessibility and comfort of stations also aﬀect demand.
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verifiable, this will not be true for the aggregate measure. Thus, it is a useful
first approximation to assume that θ is non-verifiable (Laﬀont and Tirole,
1993, ch. 4).8 There is a strictly increasing function K(θ) measuring the
minimal costs of reaching quality level θ. In addition, running the network
involves fixed costs F .9
We assume that the price for the final good is not regulated. Except
for section 4.2, there is a linear access charge a determined by a regulator.
Consistent with the assumption that θ is unverifiable, the regulator is unable
to enforce quality dependent access prices. Production is modelled as follows:
• Stage 1: The quality level θ of the network infrastructure is deter-
mined, either by a vertically integrated monopolist I or a separated
(“upstream”) network operator U .
• Stage 2: For given a and θ, the integrated monopolist I or a separated
(“downstream”) service provider D sets the retail price pR (θ, a) for the
final product.10 For notational simplicity, we shall henceforth write
pI(θ) ≡ pR(θ, 0) for the retail price under integration.11
2.2 Defining Investment Incentives
We write the profit function of the firm taking the quality decision as
Π (θ, a) = pU(θ)D
¡
pR(θ, a), θ
¢
−K(θ)− F. (1)
Here pU(θ) is the price per unit of demand obtained by the firm taking the
quality decision: For separation with a constant linear access price a > 0,
pU(θ) = a, and pR(θ, a) is the retail price of a downstream monopolist who
faces quality level θ and access price a. For vertical integration, pU(θ) =
8Even in cases where it is possible to measure some aspects of quality (e.g. punctuality),
it is typically very costly to attribute this to the performance of the network owner or the
downstream firm.
9W.l.o.g. we abstract from variable costs of running the network.
10We do not require θ to be verifiable by third parties, but it should be common knowl-
edge between I and D.
11The price under integration corresponds to the price of a separated downstream firm
with zero marginal costs.
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pR(θ, 0) = pI(θ).We explicitly distinguish π (θ, a) = pU(θ)D
¡
pR(θ, a), θ
¢
, the
firm’s revenue, from Π (θ, a) . We write πI(θ) ≡ π(θ, 0) and ΠI (θ) ≡ Π (θ, 0)
for the respective terms under integration.
Definition 1 (investment incentive) Suppose θH > θL. The incentive to
raise the quality level from θL to θH is given by the resulting revenue increase
∆π (θL, θH , a) ≡ π (θH , a)− π(θL, a).
Observe that ∆π (θL, θH , a) is non-negative. Further, it not only depends
on the demand function, but also on the institutional structure through its
eﬀect on pR(θ, a) and pU(θ). K (θ), on the other hand, is assumed to be inde-
pendent of institutions. Thus, if for a given demand function ∆π (θL, θH , a)
is higher under integration than under separation for arbitrary θH > θL,
network quality will be higher under integration. Assuming that π (θ, a) is
diﬀerentiable, this will be true, for instance, if the marginal investment in-
centive πθ (θ, a) is higher under integration for all θ ∈ [θL, θH ].12 DefiningbD(θ, a) ≡ D ¡pR(θ, a), θ¢, the marginal investment incentive is given by
πθ = pU(θ) bDθ + pUθ bD. (2)
2.3 The Eﬀect of Quality on Retail Prices and Demand
Much of the following will depend on how the quality improvement aﬀects
the equilibrium retail price pR and the downstream demand. One might
expect that higher quality will unequivocally lead to higher prices and higher
demand. Yet, it is possible that either price or demand decreases as a result
of a quality increase.13 With ∆pR (θL, θH , a) ≡ pR(θH , a) − pR(θL, a) and
∆ bD (θL, θH , a) ≡ bD(θH , a)− bD(θL, a), we can distinguish three diﬀerent cases.
Definition 2 A quality increase from θL to θH is of type
(i) (p+D−) if ∆pR (θL, θH , a) > 0,∆ bD (θL, θH , a) < 0;
(ii) (p+D+) if ∆pR (θL, θH , a) ≥ 0,∆ bD (θL, θH , a) ≥ 0;
(iii) (p−D+) if ∆pR (θL, θH , a) < 0,∆ bD (θL, θH , a) > 0.
12Throughout the paper, subscripts denote partial derivatives.
13It is straightforward to show that prices and demand cannot both fall as a result of
an increase in θ.
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Lemma 1 demonstrates how the equilibrium eﬀects of a marginal change
in quality depend on the form of the demand function.
Lemma 1 Assume that the downstream firm’s revenue function πD is con-
cave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Then a marginal quality increase
is of type
(i) p+D− if Dpθ > DθDp
³
Dp
pR−a +Dpp
´
;
(ii) p+D+ if− DθpR−a ≤ Dpθ ≤
Dθ
Dp
³
Dp
pR−a +Dpp
´
;
(iii) p−D+ if Dpθ < − DθpR−a .
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that (p+D−) implies Dpθ > 0 whenever pR > a, i.e., the eﬀect
of quality on demand is larger for higher prices,14 and conversely, (p−D+)
implies Dpθ < 0. Thus (p+D+) holds for Dpθ = 0, i.e., for quality increases
leading to a parallel shift of demand.
Let us illustrate the diﬀerent types of quality increases using specific
demand functions. Most standard demand functions correspond to (p+D+).
For instance, suppose D (p, θ) = α − βp + θ, α > 0, β > 0, θ > 0, so that
changes in θ correspond to parallel shifts of demand. In this case, pR (θ, a) =
(α+ θ + βa)/2β and bD(θ, a) = (α+ θ − βa)/2, thus ∆pR > 0 and ∆ bD > 0.
Another standard example is D (p, θ) = α− βp/θ, α > 0, β > 0, θ > 0, where
changes in θ correspond to changes of the slope of demand. Here, pR (θ, a) =
(αθ + βa)/2β and bD(θ, a) = (αθ − βa)/2θ, with ∆pR > 0,∆ bD > 0. As a
last example for (p+D+), consider any demand function D (p, θ) = f (θ) g (p)
such that f is increasing and g is decreasing. In this case, ∆pR = 0,∆ bD > 0.
Regimes (p+D−) and (p−D+) are usually associated with non-standard
demand functions. For example, D (p, θ) = θp1/2θ+1− p, θ > 0, corresponds
to (p+D−) for suitable θ. Figure 1 illustrates this finding for a = 0 and a
selection of quality levels θ ∈ {1
8
, 1
7
, 1
6
, 1
5
, 1
4
}. Any increase of θ within this set
involves ∆ bD < 0. This can be explained as follows. For definiteness, think
of demand as arising from a population of heterogeneous customers, each
with unit demand and the willingness to pay (WTP) depending positively
14If Dpp ≤ 0, the r.h.s. of inequality (i) is obviously positive, if Dpp > 0, then ΠDpp < 0
implies that the r.h.s. is positive.
6
on quality. In Figure 1, quality increases have a particularly strong positive
eﬀect on the WTP of customers who already have a high WTP. Thus, it
becomes attractive to raise prices strongly so as to milk the customers with
high WTP and sacrifice demand from low WTP customers.
<Figure 1 here>
A similar exercise demonstrates that the demand function D (p, θ) =
(2− p)θ (1− p) , θ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 corresponds to (p−D+) for suitable θ.
Figure 2 illustrates this for a = 0 and the quality levels θ = {1, ..., 5}.
<Figure 2 here>
The intuition of Figure 2 is opposite to Figure 1.
3 Integration vs. Separation
We now compare investment incentives under vertical integration and vertical
separation. In the integrated case, the same decision maker determines θ and
p. Thus, using the envelope theorem,
πIθ = pI(θ) ·Dθ
¡
pI(θ), θ
¢
. (3)
Under vertical separation, the relevant prices are pR = pR(θ, a) and pU =
a. The marginal investment incentive is thus given by
πUθ = a bDθ = a £Dp(pR(θ, a), θ) · pRθ +Dθ(pR(θ, a), θ)¤ . (4)
Therefore, under vertical separation, the upstream monopolist generally has
an incentive to invest even if access charges are insensitive to quality, since
she is rewarded for higher quality by higher access revenue, provided thatbDθ > 0. Note that, contrary to (3), (4) not only contains a direct eﬀect Dθ of
quality, but also a price-mediated eﬀect Dp · pRθ : Quality aﬀects downstream
prices, which aﬀect demand. The next result compares investment incentives.
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Proposition 1 (integration vs. separation) Suppose pI(θ) > a > 0. In-
tegration yields stronger incentives than separation if:
pI(θ) ·Dθ
¡
pI(θ), θ
¢
> a bDθ = a £Dp(pR(θ, a), θ) · pRθ +Dθ(pR(θ, a), θ)¤ (5)
(i) For (p+D−), the marginal investment incentive is stronger under ver-
tical integration than under separation.
(ii) For (p+D+), the marginal investment incentive is stronger under verti-
cal integration than under separation, except possibly if Dpθ is positive
and suﬃciently large.
(iii) For (p−D+), the marginal investment incentive may be stronger under
vertical separation than under integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
It may seem surprising that the only definite underinvestment results
arise for (p+D−) and for those (p+D+)-cases where Dpθ ≤ 0. After all, a
standard vertical externality argument would suggest that under separation
the network owner invests less than under integration, as she does not take
positive quality eﬀects on downstream demand into account.15 Such a ver-
tical externality does indeed exist in our model, i.e. increasing upstream
quality increases downstream profits (ΠDθ = (p− a)Dθ > 0). Thus, under
separation the network owner will always invest less than she would if she
were to maximize total industry profits ΠT . However, vertical separation
does not only mean that the investing party does not consider the eﬀect of a
quality increase on downstream profits. It also means that downstream prices
rise from pI(θ) to pR(θ, a). Therefore, a vertically separated upstream firm
might, in principle, have higher incentives to invest than an integrated firm
if the quality increase enhances demand more strongly for higher retail prices
(Dpθ > 0). The latter eﬀect may outweigh the standard vertical externality
if it is suﬃciently strong, explaining the ambiguity for (p+D+).
For (p−D+), the direct eﬀect of quality on demand is lower for separation
(because Dpθ < 0), thus reinforcing the argument that investment incentives
15Compare e.g. Hart (1995) for similar arguments.
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are stronger under integration. However, as the downstream firm decreases
prices as a result of the quality increase, there is an additional incentive to
increase quality under separation, which may lead to stronger investment
incentives under separation.
The first row of Table 1 summarizes these ideas. The diﬀerence between
the revenue of an integrated firm πI and a vertically separated upstream
firm πU is the sum of πT − πU = πD and πI − πT . The derivative of the first
expression (πDθ > 0) reflects the familiar vertical externality of quality en-
hancement on downstream revenue. The derivative of the second expression
∂(πI − πT )/∂θ reflects the price eﬀect resulting because prices are usually
not the same in the separated and integrated case.
<table 1>
Using Proposition 1, it can be shown that with the demand functions from
section 2.3, investment incentives are higher under integration. However,
we can provide other examples for (p+D+)- and (p−D+), where investment
incentives are higher under separation. For simplicity, we shall work with
piecewise linear functions with discontinuities. It will be obvious that these
simplifications are not crucial for the results.
Our first example is illustrated in Figure 3a. It corresponds to (p+D+),
where Dθ(p, θ) is larger for higher prices. Assume that demand is given by16
D (p, θ) =



1− p if p ≤ 0.5
θ if 0.5 < p ≤ 1
0 if p > 1
.
Now suppose the initial quality level is θL > 0, but close to zero. Consider
a quality increase to some θH > θL. Under integration pI (θL) = 0.5 and
revenues are πI(θL) = 0.25. This remains true as long as θH ≤ 0.25.17
Therefore, the investment incentive is ∆πI (θL, θH) = 0 for θH ≤ 0.25. For
16Intuitively, think of heterogeneous consumers with unit demand. Half the population
has quality-independent reservation prices, the rest is quality-sensitive, willing to pay p = 1
if and only if a reservation quality-level is reached.
17For any level θH , the integrated firm must choose between charging p = 1, resulting
in revenue θH , or continuing to charge p = 0.5, resulting in revenue 0.25 as before.
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θH > 0.25, pI (θH) = 1, and revenues are πI(θH) = θH , so that investment
incentives are ∆πI (θL, θH) = θH − 0.25.
Now consider separation with a = 0.5. As θL > 0, the downstream
firm prefers to set p = 1 and obtain profits of (pR − a)D(pR, θL) = 0.5θL
rather than set p = 0.5 and obtain (pR − a)D(pR, θL) = 0 · (1− 0.5) = 0.
Access revenues are therefore πU(θL, a) = 0.5 · D (1, θL) = 0.5θL ≈ 0. For
θH > 0, the access revenues is πU(θH , a) = 0.5θH . There is thus always a
positive investment incentive ∆πU (θL, θH , a) = 0.5 (θH − θL) ≈ 0.5θH under
separation, and it is higher than under integration as long as 0.5θH > θH −
0.25, i.e. θH < 0.5. Note the simple intuition of this result. At the original
optimal price under integration and below, demand is insensitive to quality.
To enter the quality-sensitive region, the integrated firm would have to raise
the price. Because the price elasticity is infinite near pI (θL), this would
result in a huge loss of customers with low WTP. As long as θH is not much
higher than θL, the quality increase is thus useless for the integrated firm.
Under separation, prices are in the region where demand is quality sensitive
to begin with–hence the positive incentive to invest.
<Figure 3 here>
Our second example corresponds to (p−D+), where Dθ(p, θ) is larger for
lower prices. Suppose that, as in Figure 3b, demand is given by
D (p, θ) =
(
1− p+ θ if p ≤ 0.55
1− p if 0.55 < p ≤ 1
.
Consider the incentive to increase quality from θL = 0 to θH = 1. Under
integration, pI(θL) = D(pI(θL)) = 0.5 and revenue is πI(θL) = 0.25 with-
out investment. With investment, πI(θH) = 0.7975, since pI(θH) = 0.55
and D(pI(θH)) = 1.45. The investment incentive under integration is thus
∆πI (θL, θH) = 0.5475.
Under separation, with a = 0.5, the upstream firm’s revenue is πU(θL, a) =
0.125, since pS(θL, a) = 0.75 and D(pR(θL, a)) = 0.25 without investment.
With investment, the firm’s revenue is πU(θH) = 0.725, since pR(θH , a) =
0.55 and D(pR(θH , a)) = 1.45. The investment incentive under separation is
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thus given by ∆πU (θL, θH , a) = 0.6, which is higher than that under inte-
gration. The intuition of this result is straightforward. To reap the benefits
of the quality increase from θL to θH , the separated downstream monopolist
must cut its retail price to enter the region where demand is quality sensi-
tive, which reinforces the demand enhancing eﬀect of the quality increase.
The integrated monopolist, in turn, is in the quality sensitive region to be-
gin with and further increases the retail price, thereby reducing the demand
enhancing eﬀect of the quality increase.
To sum up, it is possible to construct intuitive examples where investment
incentives are higher under separation than under integration. Nevertheless,
these examples are somewhat contrived. Thus, the intuition that vertical
separation is negative for investment incentives is strengthened rather than
weakened by our analysis.18
3.1 The Social Welfare Benchmark
Let us compare the investment incentives derived under vertical integration
and separation with those in the welfare optimum. We briefly adapt Spence’s
(1975) approach to our setting.19 Consider vertical integration. Let S =R∞
pR D(p˜, θ)dp˜ be the consumer surplus, and
ΠI = pRD(pR, θ)−K(θ)− F (6)
the integrated monopolist’s profit for any given price pR. Total surplus is
then W = S +ΠI , and the following relation obtains
Wθ = Sθ +ΠIθ =
Z ∞
pR
Dθ(p˜, θ)dp˜+ΠIθ > ΠIθ. (7)
Thus, for ΠIθ = 0, we must have Wθ > 0. In other words, at any given
price pR, the vertically integrated monopolist underprovides quality relative
18If θ were assumed to be verifiable, the integration outcome could be duplicated in the
case of separation, using quality-dependent access prices.
19Note that in Spence (1975) the costs of producing x output units with quality θ are
given by c(x, θ). In our setup, the costs of attaining the quality level θ are given by K(θ)
and are thus independent of output.
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to the social optimum. Hence, in those cases where vertically separated firms
provide less quality than integrated firms, vertical integration is preferable
to vertical separation.
Clearly, this is a statement of local ineﬃciency in the sense that it holds
for a fixed retail price pR. It is well-known that if the retail price in the wel-
fare optimum diﬀers substantially from that under vertical integration, the
integrated monopolist may actually provide more than the socially optimal
level of quality (see e.g. Wolfstetter 1999). In such cases, our underinvest-
ment result relative to integration does not automatically imply that there is
underinvestment relative to the social welfare benchmark. In fact, by reduc-
ing investment incentives, separation might correct for overinvestment under
integration.
4 Means to Improve Investment Incentives
4.1 Competition for the Downstream Market
We now analyze the eﬀects of competition for the downstream market on
quality.20 We still suppose the industry is vertically separated and there is
a designated private network owner. The downstream monopoly, however,
is auctioned oﬀ.21 There is a pool of n identical firms participating in the
franchise bidding process for the separated downstream monopoly. Assume
the course of events can be summarized as follows.
• Stage 1: Given the access charge a, the upstream firm U determines
investment in quality θ.
• Stage 2: Observing a and θ, each competitor i = 1, ..., n bids a price
pi at which they will provide downstream services. The firm with the
20This resembles the case of the British railway system–though many important insti-
tutional aspects of this case diﬀer from our model.
21The standard idea that competition for the market à la Demsetz (1968) drives down
quality (Viscusi et al., 2000, 403) is not applicable to our setting, as it requires that the
bidding firms are also those responsible for quality decisions. Similarly, multidimensional
auctions (Branco, 1997) for the downstream market cannot solve the problem.
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lowest bid p wins the auction and has to charge the price of the second-
lowest bid, p. The winner thus obtains profits (p− a)D(p, θ).
We apply the solution concept of subgame perfect equilibrium. In the
equilibrium of the second stage, the price p for services is driven down to
average cost, i.e. pR = p = a. Anticipating this result, the upstream firm
U chooses quality so as to maximize ΠU(θ, a) = aD(θ, a)−K(θ)− F in the
first stage of the game. The marginal investment incentive is thus
πUθ (θ, a) = aDθ(θ, a). (8)
As in the case of the integrated monopolist (see (3)), there is no price-
mediated eﬀect. However, there is a diﬀerence with respect to the direct
eﬀect. If pI(θ) > a, the price per unit of demand obtained by the investor is
lower than in the integrated case. Yet, competition for the downstream mar-
ket might overcompensate this disadvantage if the quality eﬀect on demand
is much stronger for lower prices, i.e. Dθ(θ, a) À Dθ(pI(θ), θ), which would
require Dpθ ¿ 0. The next Proposition makes this result more precise.
Proposition 2 (competition vs. integration) Suppose pI(θ) > a. Then
if (p+D−) and (p+D+) hold for a = 0, the marginal investment incentive
is weaker under vertical separation with competition than under integration.
For (p−D+), incentives are higher under separation with competition.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, except for (p−D+), competition does not solve the underinvest-
ment problem; but does it alleviate it? To answer this question, consider
the investment incentives in a vertically separated industry with and with-
out competition for the downstream market (see (8) and (4), respectively).
In both cases, the price pU per unit of demand obtained by the upstream
firm is a. Since retail prices are driven down to pR = a by competition for
the market, the downstream firm is restricted to zero profits. Consequently,
there is no vertical externality: higher investment does not increase down-
stream profits. This might lead one to conclude that investment incentives
are higher with competition. However, this is not always true. The de-
mand eﬀect of quality is Dθ(θ, a) with competition, the corresponding term
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is bDθ(pR(θ, a), θ) = Dp ¡pR(θ, a), θ¢ · pRθ + Dθ ¡pR(θ, a), θ¢ in the absence of
competition. For (p+D−) and (p+D+), i.e. for Dpθ positive or not too nega-
tive, there is a negative price-mediated eﬀect of quality without competition.
On the other hand, the positive direct eﬀect is higher when there is no compe-
tition
¡
Dθ
¡
pR(θ, a), θ
¢
> Dθ(θ, a)
¢
if Dpθ > 0. Our next result summarizes
the outcomes.
Proposition 3 (eﬀects of competition) Under separation, marginal in-
vestment incentives are stronger with competition than without if
Dθ(θ, a) > Dp
¡
pR(θ, a), θ
¢ · pRθ +Dθ ¡pR(θ, a), θ¢ = bDθ. (9)
(i) For (p+D−), the marginal investment incentive under vertical separa-
tion is stronger with competition than without.
(ii) For (p+D+), the marginal investment incentive under vertical sepa-
ration is stronger with competition than without competition, except
possibly if Dpθ is positive and suﬃciently large.
(iii) For (p−D+), the marginal investment incentive under vertical separa-
tion may be weaker with competition than without.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, although downstream competition eliminates the vertical external-
ity, the overall eﬀect of competition on incentives is ambiguous.
4.2 Non-linear Access Prices
We now turn to the analysis of more general forms of access prices in the
absence of competition. Assume that the upstream monopoly charges a two-
part tariﬀ of the form T (a˜) = A+ a˜D(·); that is, the downstream monopolist
pays a fixed premium A plus a variable access charge a˜. In addition, suppose
that the upstream firm chooses a˜, A and θ. More specifically, assume that
the upstream firm is free to choose a linear or non-linear pricing schedule,
and that there are no regulatory restrictions imposed on the level of the
access tariﬀ components a˜ or A. Finally, suppose θ and D(p, θ) are common
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knowledge for the two firms.22 In this setting, it is straightforward to derive
the following result (see Table 1, row 3).
Proposition 4 (two-part access tariﬀs) Suppose the industry is vertically
separated and the network monopolist is allowed to set an arbitrary two-part
tariﬀ T (a˜) = A+ a˜D(·). Then
(i) the variable access charge will be chosen as a˜ = 0;
(ii) the incentive to invest in quality is the same as under integration;
(iii) the fixed premium is chosen as A = ΠI(pI(θ), θ).
The intuition is straightforward. As a higher θ increases downstream
profits, the upstream firm can choose a higher A. This allows the upstream
firm to completely extract the profit of the downstream firm. Hence, she
enjoys the full benefits of the investment and thus has the same incentive
to invest as a vertically integrated firm.23 Thus, as with competition for
the downstream market the vertical externality is eliminated. In addition,
however, unrestricted two-part access tariﬀs eliminate the price distortion
introduced by the vertical separation of the industry. Competition for the
downstream market alone is not suﬃcient to produce this result.24
5 Conclusion
We investigated how institutional settings aﬀect investment incentives, where
the latter are defined as the revenue increases resulting from raising quality.
Our analysis highlighted the interplay of two eﬀects associated with vertical
22We do not, however, require θ to be verifiable by third parties.
23Of course, this result requires that the downstream firm can be forced to zero profits.
Aside from the strong informational requirements needed to achieve this, there is also some
experimental evidence casting doubt on this possibility (Roth, 1995): In similar games,
where two players divide some arbitrary resource (e.g. ultimatum games), players do not
accept low profits, even when they are above the reservation value and, anticipating this,
upstream players avoid attempting to extract all profits.
24Competition for the downstream market would have to be supplemented by access
price regulations that impose a = pI(θI), where θI is the profit maximizing quality level
under integration. A second-price auction of the type described above then implements
pR = p = a = pI(θI), and the upstream firm chooses θI .
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separation: (i) the familiar vertical externality that tends to decrease in-
vestment incentives, and (ii) a price eﬀect that may reinforce or weaken the
vertical externality. Our main findings are the following:
First, the common presumption that investment incentives are higher
under vertical integration turns out to be mostly correct. The price eﬀect
rarely dominates the vertical externality, and it does so only for peculiar
demand functions. Second, both competition for the downstream market
and unrestricted two-part access tariﬀs eliminate the vertical quality exter-
nality, because they lead to zero downstream profits. Third, unrestricted
two-part access tariﬀs eliminate the price distortion of vertical separation,
whereas competition for the downstream market alone does not. Adequate
non-linear access pricing thus virtually replicates the situation under a ver-
tically integrated monopoly.
There is ample scope for further research. First, we did not consider in-
vestment in the downstream market. Second, we restricted ourselves to the
analysis of a chain of monopolies. Studying imperfect downstream competi-
tion would be instructive. Third, empirical studies could help to determine
the characteristics of the demand for the final good, which in turn would
inform policy decisions with respect to the institutional setting.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the implicit function theorem,
pRθ = −
πDpθ
πDpp
= − [p
R − a]Dpθ +Dθ
2Dp + [pR − a]Dpp
.
Thus, pRθ ≥ (≤) 0 if
πDpθ = [pR − a]Dpθ +Dθ ≥ (≤) 0 or Dpθ ≥ (≤)−
Dθ
pR − a .
Substituting pRθ into bDθ = Dp·pRθ +Dθ and rearranging terms yields bDθ ≥ (≤)
0 if
Dpθ ≤ (≥)
Dθ
Dp
µ
Dp
pR − a +Dpp
¶
.
The results now follow immediately from Dθ > 0, Dp < 0 and ΠDpp < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. (3) and (4) imply (5), which in turn implies
(i)-(iii) as follows:
(i) For (p+D−), the r.h.s of (5) is negative, and the claim follows.
(ii) For (p+D+), Dp(pR(θ, a), θ) · pRθ < 0. Hence, it suﬃces to show that
a > 0 implies pI(θ)Dθ(pI(θ), θ) > aDθ(pR(θ, a), θ). As pI(θ) > a, this
condition clearly holds if Dθ(pI(θ), θ) > Dθ(pR(θ, a), θ). By Lemma 1,
integration thus yields higher incentives provided Dpθ ≤ 0 or at least
not very high.
(iii) For (p−D+), the very negative values of Dpθ lead to pRθ (θ, a) < 0, which
gives a positive first term in the brackets on the r.h.s of (5) that is absent
under integration. However, Dθ is higher for integration case than for
separation. It is unclear which eﬀect dominates.
Proof of Proposition 2. Marginal investment incentives are pI(θ)Dθ(pI(θ), θ)
and aDθ(θ, a), respectively. As a < pI(θ), incentives are higher under sepa-
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ration if p ·Dθ (p, θ) is decreasing in p, that is Dθ + pDpθ < 0. By Lemma 1,
this coincides with (p−D+).
Proof of Proposition 3. (4) and (8) imply (9), leading to (i)-(iii) as
follows.
(i) For (p+D−), Dpθ is positive and suﬃciently large so that bDθ < 0. Since
Dθ > 0 by definition, the claim follows immediately.
(ii) For (p+D+), Dpθ is suﬃciently small in absolute value so that pRθ > 0
and the indirect eﬀect Dp
¡
pR(θ, a), θ
¢ · pRθ is negative. Incentives are
thus higher with competition ifDθ(θ, a)−Dθ
¡
pR(θ, a), θ
¢
≥ 0 or at least¯¯
Dθ(θ, a)−Dθ
¡
pR(θ, a), θ
¢¯¯
suﬃciently small. Because pR(θ, a) > a,
this is true as long as Dpθ is negative or at least not too positive.
Hence, the result follows.
(iii) For (p−D+), Dpθ is negative with suﬃciently large absolute value so
that bDθ > 0. Under these circumstances, Dθ(θ, a) may be smaller thanbDθ, and hence it remains unclear in which case incentives are higher.
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Table 1: Summary of results
Institutional πT − πU = πD πI − πT
Arrangements
Vertical Separation/ pR(θ, a)D(pR(θ, a), θ) pR(θ, 0)D(pR(θ, 0), θ)
Linear Prices −aD(pR(θ, a), θ) −pR(θ, a)D(pR(θ, a), θ)
Vertical Separation/ = 0 pR(θ, 0)D(pR(θ, 0), θ)
Downstream Competition −aD(θ, a)
Vertical Separation/ = 0 = 0
Non-linear Access Tariﬀs
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Figure 1: An example for (p+D−)-quality-increases
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Figure 2: An example for (p−D+)-quality-increases
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Figure 3: Two examples with higher incentives under separation
